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Identity, Culture and Stories: Empathy and the War
on Terrorism
William D. Casebeer*
According to the current National Security Strategy, the
global war on terror is a specific focus for national security.1
While billions have been spent prosecuting some aspects of
this war (for example, by attacking state sponsors of
terrorism), other aspects have been neglected. Here, I argue
that grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from a
comprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell.
Understanding the narratives that influence the genesis,
growth, maturation, and transformation of terrorist
organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for
undermining the efficacy of those narratives to deter,
disrupt, and defeat terrorist groups. Such a “counternarrative strategy” will have multiple components with
layered asynchronous effects. While effective counter-stories
will be difficult to coordinate and will involve multiple agents
of action, their formulation is a necessary part of any
comprehensive counter-terrorism effort. Indeed, a failure on
our part to come to grips with the narrative dimensions of
the war on terrorism, and with the larger concept of culture
of which it is a part, is a weakness already exploited by
groups such as Al Qaeda. We can fully expect any adaptive
adversary to act quickly to fill story gaps and exploit
weaknesses in our narrative to ensure continued survival.
More than giving us another tool with which to confront
terrorism, narrative considerations also allow us to deal
better in general with the emerging security threat of violent
non-state actors and armed groups. A critical portion of the
system responsible for the production and replication of
socially transmitted behaviors will be that which deals with
narratives and stories.
Justifying the need for and exploring the components of
a counter-narrative strategy is a task for a book; this Article
*

© 2008 William D. Casebeer.
* PhD, LtCol (USAF), SHAPE US Survey (NATO Military Headquarters).
1
. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
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briefly sketches only the basics, discussing the psychological
aspects of counter-terrorism and why stories will play a
critical role in the ecosystem of violence, the essential
components of a story, a typology of narratives offered by
nascent terrorist groups throughout their development, a
simple Aristotelian rhetorical model for evaluating story
success, principles to guide the formulation of counternarratives, and complications and provisos, as well as a
consideration of the institutional implications of my position.
This summary intends to provoke thought about new
counter-terrorism tools.
Why think that storytelling has anything to do with
terrorism and counter-terrorism? Consider the ineliminable
psychological aspects of terrorism: People choose to form or
join organizations that use indiscriminant violence as a tactic
to achieve their political objectives for multiple reasons—all
of them dealing at some point with human psychology.
People feel alienated from their surroundings; they are
denied political opportunity by the state; the state fails to
provide basic necessities; they identify with those who
advocate the use of violence; they are angered by excessive
state force against political opponents; their essential needs
are not being met; they feel deprived relative to peer groups
elsewhere. These have been offered as “root causes” of
contentious politics in general and terrorism in particular. My
purpose is not to defend any particular position about root
causes, but merely to point out that these causes have a
proximate psychological mechanism. They exert influence by
affecting the human mind and brain. If stories are part and
parcel of human cognition, we would also consequently
expect that stories might affect how these causes play out to
germinate, grow, and sustain terrorism.

1. WHAT IS IN A STORY?
The lack of any widely accepted definition for “story”
hampers discussion of stories and narratives. Indeed, an
entire school of thought in literary criticism (“post
modernism”) is predicated on the fact that no necessary and
sufficient list exists of conditions a piece of text must meet
to be a story. We can agree with the postmodernists that
defining “story” is difficult without thinking, however, that
the concept plays no useful purpose. In that sense, the
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concept “story” is like the concept “game.” No list of
necessary and sufficient conditions exists for a game, but
that does not mean the concept is useless or that no “family
resemblances” exist between games that are useful to
consider.
A good beginning at a theory of stories comes from the
nineteenth-century German writer Gustav Freytag. Freytag
believed that narratives followed a general pattern: a
beginning, a problem that leads to a climax, and a resolution
of the problem as an ending. A coherent unified story could
thus be as short as three sentences consisting of setup,
climax, and resolution: “John was hungry. He went to the
store and bought a sandwich. It was delicious.” This
particular story is not very interesting or compelling, but it
nonetheless is a coherent narrative. This “Freytag Triangle,”
depicted below, captures the general structure of a story:2

Figure 1. The Freytag Triangle (1863)3
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Contemporary literary theorist Patrick Hogan amplifies
the basic Freytag structure, pointing out that most plots
involve an agent (normally, a hero or protagonist) striving to
2

. See generally ELIAS J. MACEWAN, FREYTAG’S TECHNICUE OF THE DRAMA: AN
EXPOSITION OF DRAMATIC COMPOSITION AND ART BY GUSTAV FREYTAG (Benjamin Blom, Inc.
1968) (1863).
3
. Barbara McManus, Freytag’s Triangle, http://www.cnr.edu/home/
bmcmanus/freytag.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). I am indebted to Dr.
McManus for allowing me to make use her Freytag Triangle graphic.
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achieve some goal, usually despite the machinations of an
antagonist, or villain. The structure includes a person, or
group of persons, and a series of events driven by their
attempts to achieve some objective.4 The study of
mythology and consideration of most forms of storytelling,
whether oral, written, traditional, or contemporary, support
this familiar analysis.5

2. STORIES AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
Using this working “theory of story,” we can gain insight
into why stories are so important for structuring human
thought. First, stories often are rich in metaphors and
analogies; metaphors, in turn, affect our most basic attitudes
toward the world. For example, suppose we think of “Islamic
fundamentalism” as a disease. A simple narrative about
fundamentalist Islam might be this: “We want world
communities to respect human rights. Fundamentalist
Muslims disrespect some of those rights. We can prevent
them from doing more harm by taking action now.” This
implies a series of actions that ought to be done in reaction
to fundamentalism (e.g., combat its spread, focus on this
“public health problem” by inoculating people against it,
consider those who try to spread it as “evil agents up to no
good” or at the very least as modern day “Typhoid Marys”).6
Reasoning by metaphor and analogy, a research
program explored by Mark Johnson, George Lakoff, Giles
Fauconnier, and Mark Turner argues that our most complex
mental tasks are usually carried out not by the “classical
mechanics” of rational actor theory (where stories really
have no place, or are, at least relegated to the background),
4

. See PATRICK COLM HOGAN , THE MIND AND ITS STORIES: NARRATIVE UNIVERSALS AND
HUMAN EMOTION 205–12, 221–27 (2003).
5
. See RAPHAEL PATAI, THE ARAB MIND 43–77 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1983)
(1976) for an interesting and extremely controversial take on the role of
narrative in the “Arab mind.” Recall Joseph Campbell’s analysis of the
structure of most famous legends from antiquity, which involve striving on
the part of a hero, a test of some kind, and a return to the point of
departure with new knowledge and greater self-understanding. JOSEPH
CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 30 (Pantheon Books 1961) (1949).
6
. Again, I do not think the contagion metaphor is necessarily
appropriate, even for morally objectionable forms of fundamentalist Islam.
But
compare
some
of
the
rhetoric
from
Daniel
Pipes,
http://www.danielpipes. org (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). For interesting
responses to this rhetoric, see any of the articles from THE NEW CRUSADES:
CONSTRUCTING THE MUSLIM ENEMY (Emran Qureshi & Michal A. Sells eds., 2003).
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but rather by a set of analogy making and metaphor
mapping abilities that form the core of human cognition. 7
Exploration into the “story-telling mind” is a research
program that combines metaphor and analogy into an
examination of the powerful grip narrative has on human
cognition. Narratives can restructure our mental spaces in
ways that profoundly affect our reasoning ability and,
ultimately, what we make of the world. Think of the grip that
the “Jihad versus McWorld”8 narrative has on Al Qaeda and
how this affects the way they think about the future.9 As
Mark Turner notes, “Story is a basic principle of mind. Most
of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking is
organized as stories.”10
If making stories foundational to thought seems a
stretch, ample evidence supports the proposition that stories
influence our ability to recall events, motivate people to act,
modulate our emotional reactions to events, cue certain
heuristics and biases, structure our problem-solving
capabilities, and ultimately perhaps even constitute our very
identity.11 Stories probably play a role in developing and
7

. Classic works include GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK:
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND’S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES (2002); DEDRE GENTNER , KEITH
HOLYOAK, & BOICHO KOKINOV, THE ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE
(2001); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
8
. This is the structuring metaphor of Benjamin Barber’s “clash of the
world views” book, BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND
TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD (1995). See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (Touchstone 1998) (1997).
9
. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 7, at 249–53; MARK TURNER, THE
LITERARY MIND 20 (1996).
10 . TURNER, supra 9, at v. See generally Anthony Patton, The World as
Story (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11 . See, e.g., Mabel Chau-ping Wong, The Effects of Story Schemata on
Narrative Recall, in THINKING LANGUAGE, 147, 147–70 (Kitty P. Y. Wong &
Christopher
F.
Green
eds.,
1995),
available
at
http://repository.ust.hk/dspace/ bitstream/1783.1/1337/1/thinklang10.pdf;
Daniel Dennett, The Self as Center of Narrative Gravity, in SELF AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 103–15 (Frank S. Kessel et al., eds., 1992),
available at http://ase.tufts.edu/ cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm; Arthur C.
Graesser & Glenn V. Nakamura, The Impact of a Schema on
Comprehension and Memory, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 59 (H.
Bower ed. 1982); ALICIA JUARRERO, DYNAMICS IN ACTION 217–44 (1999); TROY S.
THOMAS & WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, USAF INSTITUTE FOR NAT’L SECURITY STUDIES, OCCASIONAL
PAPER NO. 52, VIOLENT SYSTEMS: DEFEATING TERRORISTS, INSURGENTS, AND OTHER NON-STATE
ADVERSARIES
69,
75
(2004),
available
at
http://www.
usafa.af.mil/df/inss/occasion.cfm [hereinafter VIOLENT SYSTEMS]; TROY S. THOMAS,
STEPHEN D. KISER & WILLIAM D. CASEBEER , WARLORDS RISING: CONFRONTING VIOLENT NONSTATE ACTORS 190–91 (2005).
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cuing empathy for other members of your salient group. Any
of these aspects of the narrative would be fascinating and
important to examine in detail.
Now that we have a basic understanding of what
narratives are, and have reason to believe they are
influential in acts of human cognition salient to terrorist
group formation, we can examine the role stories play across
the life cycle of terrorist organizations.

3. NARRATIVES AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LIFE
CYCLES
Terrorist organizations have life cycles. They have a
genesis point, they grow, reach maturity, and eventually
transform by, among other things, dying, being co-opted by
the state, or morphing into a peaceful non-state actor. As
Thomas and Casebeer have pointed out, different
organizational structures develop during this life cycle, some
more important than others depending on the organization’s
degree of development.12 During maturity, terrorist
organizations will develop survival as a goal, and this
organizational consideration can help us understand why
they take some of the actions they do.13 The life cycle
concept follows naturally from thinking of the conditions that
give rise to terrorism as an environment conducive to the
formation of violent non-state actors (VNSA). These
environments are typified by failures in governance, preexisting
identity
cleavages,
resource
scarcity
and
deprivation, and lack of political opportunity. When these
“push” factors (i.e., active causes that spur the formation of
a violent non-state actor) produce a potential VNSA (usually
at the behest of a foundational “identity entrepreneur”), the
stage is set for the growth and maturation of a nascent
organization. At maturity, a VNSA will have developed a suite
of functions it must implement if it is to maintain its
12

. See Troy S. Thomas & William D. Casebeer, Deterring Violent NonState Actors in the New Millenium [sic], STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Dec. 2002, at 1–2,
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec02/terrorism2.pdf; Troy S. Thomas &
William D. Casebeer, Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic
Systems, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Mar. 2004, at 2–4, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/
2004/ mar/casebeerMar04.pdf; see also VIOLENT SYSTEMS, supra note 11, at
47–51.
13 . Martha Crenshaw, Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and
Organizational Approaches, in INSIDE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 13, 19–26 (David
C. Rapoport ed., 1988).
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existence as an organization. These processes include
support (e.g., get resources, cultivate stakeholder relations),
maintenance (e.g., sanction defectors from the organization,
reward loyal service), cognition (e.g., plan, learn and control)
and conversion (e.g., produce terrorist acts, provide social
services to the community). A mature organization that is
functioning well has a smooth fit between these processes
(called “congruence”) and also has reserves in case the
inputs from the environment turn sour or can no longer
support the organization (these reserves constitute what is
called “negative entropy,” a term of art that refers to stores
of organized inputs such as money or ready recruits that can
help insulate systems against environmental change or
disruption of critical needs). The following schematic
summarizes this understanding:

Figure 2. Sub-System Functions in a Terrorist Organization.14
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Note the multiple critical roles narratives play
throughout the life cycle. During genesis, stories (1) provide
incentives for recruitment, particularly by providing justice
frames (simple narratives which frame discontent using
terms of justice, such as insisting that territory was wrongly
taken by others from you or your in-group in the past) that
serve to mobilize discontent, (2) help justify the need for an
14

. Graphic adopted from Troy S. Thomas.
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organization to the community in which it will be embedded,
and to first-round stakeholders (those people and
organizations who, at least initially, provide critical support
to the organization), (3) reinforce pre-existing identities
friendly to the nascent organization, (4) create necessary
identities where none exist, (5) set the stage for further
growth of the organization, (6) solidify founding members
into leadership roles, and (7) define the possible space of
actions as the organization matures.
During growth, narratives do all of the above and also (1)
reinforce role-specific obligations to ensure group members
continue to accomplish their functions, (2) provide
“firewalls” against attempts to discredit foundational myths,
(3) articulate ideological niches for the organization, and (4)
make salient to organization members the environmental
conditions conducive to organizational growth.
During maturity, stories (1) link into the command and
control system of the organization for tweaking and
updating, (2) serve as insulation against environmental
change, (3) actively support operations by motivating
organizational members and channeling organizational
thought down pre-set canals useful for the group, (4) are
used as “top cover” to allow the organization to adapt,
change goals, or otherwise modify structure and function to
ensure continued survival.
During transformation, narratives (1) smooth the
transition to new organizational forms, (2) help ease the
organization into a different set of stakeholder relationships,
(3) provide the foundation for the revivified identities which
will be used in whatever new form the organization adopts,
and (4) serve to demobilize those portions of the
organization that served their purpose or are no longer
needed.15

4. A NARRATIVE TYPOLOGY
While the diversity of purposes served by stories in
terrorist organizations makes a typology of stories difficult,
stories can still be grouped into useful camps. For instance,
foundational myths can be transactional or transcendental.
15

. These purposes deserve elaboration. No doubt empirical examples
come to mind for many of them. A thorough defense would require
inductive justification, but for now intuitive plausibility must do.
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Transactional, or pragmatic, foundational myths emphasize
transactional or instrumental considerations: if you join our
terrorist organization, our use of violence will enable you to
achieve certain materially realizable individual and collective
goals. For example, together we will make money, together
we will found a new state, or together we will change an
unjust
practice.
Transcendental
foundational
myths
emphasize otherworldly goals that are implausible to expect
to see realized or that reject worldly manifestation
altogether. For example, together we will find paradise in
God’s bosom, together we will convert every soul in the
world to Scientology. Both can be used in concert. Al
Qaeda’s foundational myth involves elements of both:
transactional pragmatic goals and transcendental religious
goals.
What is the basic structure of some of these stories and
narratives? In his paper Terror’s Mask: Insurgency Within
Islam, political scientist Michael Vlahos identifies four
elements of Al Qaeda-style narrative tropes: (1) a heroic
journey and a mythic figure, (2) the rhythm of history
captured as epic struggle and story, (3) the commanded
charge of renewal, and (4) history revealed and enjoined
through mystic literary form.16
According to Vlahos, the foundational mythic figure for
Islam is Muhammad. Bin Laden taps into this theme when he
portrays himself as following in the footsteps of Muhammad.
He too is making a heroic journey, struggling against great
odds, in a way that makes him almost as mythic in stature,
and hence all the posters and stickers praising him in places
like Pakistan or Afghanistan. Part of the reason why he is
mythic is because of the second element: bin Laden argues
that he is part of a grand struggle against Western
imperialism and decadence. His actions are part of a story
that is linked to the very fabric of Muslim history (and given
the fact that this history was in fact laced with Orientialism
and colonialism, it is no surprise that charges of neoOrientialism and neo-colonialism stick so easily). The third
aspect of the story is important: only by struggling against
these dark forces can one be renewed. To fail to struggle is
16

. MICHAEL VLAHOS, JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS DEP’T, TERROR’S MASK: INSURGENCY WITHIN
ISLAM
8
(2002),
available
at
http://www.jhuapl.edu/POW/
library/Terror_Islamsm.pdf. Again, note the similarity to parts of Campbell’s
corpus. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 5.

WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, "IDENTITY, CULTURE
SCI. & TECH. 653-688 (2008).

AND

STORIES: EMPATHY

AND THE

WAR

ON

TERRORISM ," 9(2) MINN. J.L.

662

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
to fail to play your part in a narrative that ends with Islam
triumphing over the infidel West. Finally, owing to the fourth
element, the story contains built in “insulation” from
temporary tactical successes on the part of occupying
forces: the mystical element of the narrative, especially its
otherworldly component involving rewards in the afterlife’s
paradise, means that temporal success will not necessarily
defuse the logic of the story. Resistance can and should
continue even if the security situation improves in the short
term, although brute facts about human psychology may
undermine the effectiveness of that story in the long run in
the face of improvements in the procurement of basic needs.
Closely related to Vlahos’s ideas about the essential
elements of the Islamic fundamentalist narrative is
sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer’s theory of “cosmic war.”17
Juergensmeyer suggests that religious tropes are more likely
to play a narrative role if the confrontation between two
groups can be characterized as a cosmic struggle or battle.
This is most likely in the following circumstances:
(1)
The struggle is perceived as a defense of basic
identity and dignity.
(2)Losing the struggle would be unthinkable.
(3)If the struggle is blocked and cannot be won in real
time or in real terms.18
To amplify, in cases where the struggle is over extremely
basic questions of identity and where basic human rights are
at stake; if losing the struggle seems Armageddon-like (e.g.,
you would tell a very bad story if your resistance failed); and
if the struggle is perceived as being hopeless in concrete
terms (e.g., it is impossible to see how we could beat the
occupiers using traditional “force-on-force” confrontations),
then it is very likely that the struggle can more easily be
framed in religious and metaphysical terms as a cosmic
struggle, in which case recruitment into organizations
becomes easier for certain target populations (e.g., those
predisposed to accept transcendental foundational myths).
Certainly, multiple narrative structures are at play in
17

. Critically, this is one of the characterizations of Islam that Qureshi
and Sells object to in the first article in their edited collection. Qureshi &
Sells, Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, in THE NEW CRUSADES:
CONSTRUCTING THE MUSLIM ENEMY, supra note 6, at 4.
18 . See MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 164–65 (3d ed. 2003).
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terrorism, but hopefully this brief survey has shown that
categorizing them into different types can help us better
understand how to render inert the role they play in terrorist
organizational growth. How do we go about countering these
stories?

5. COUNTER-NARRATIVE STRATEGIES
To address this practical question, we will first discuss
counter-narrative strategies in generic terms, and then offer
guidance that is more specific. Important generic principles
for counter-narrative strategy include competing myth
creation, foundational myth deconstruction, alternative
exemplar
creation,
metaphor
shifts,
identity
gerrymandering, and structural disruption.
Myth creation involves the weaving together of the
narrative elements of a story with facts about past and
present situations to create an emotionally compelling
background that very often directly influences the
susceptibility of a population to manipulation by “myth
mongers.” The fanatical devotion shown by al Qaeda
operatives stems in large part from the success Osama bin
Laden and others have had in fashioning a coherent and
appealing foundational myth, not from any rational
deliberative process. The events of September 11 can be
thought of as the punch line of a chapter in an epic that sets
“the warriors of God” against an “infidel West.” This myth
did not propagate itself via rational actor channels, but
instead was indoctrinated through a multi-pronged effort on
the part of fundamentalist strains of Islam (such as Saudi
Arabia’s Wahhabis).19 Successful myth creation may very
well leverage heuristics and biases cognitive scientists tell us
are present in human cognition; they certainly take
advantage of the availability heuristic, as this heuristic
probably
undergirds
human
propensity
to
form
stereotypes.20
Myth creation usually involves the effective use of
19

. TROY S. THOMAS ET AL., WARLORDS RISING: CONFRONTING VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS
139–40 (2005).
20 . Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973);
Denise R. Beike & Steven J. Sherman, Social Inference: Inductions,
Seductions, and Analogies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 209, 214 (Robert
S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K Srull eds., 1994).
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narrative. As we formulate an “affective strategy,” we should
keep the elements of a narrative in mind, for it is only by
disrupting the story that you can interfere with myth
creation. At the very least, good stories need protagonists,
antagonists, tests for the protagonist, a promise of
redemption, and a supporting cast of characters. Disrupting
al Qaeda’s foundational myth may involve undermining the
belief that we are the antagonists in the narrative bin Laden
is constructing. Therefore, either we can undermine the
foundational myth being used to drive VNSA development, or
we can construct an alternative myth that is a “better story”
than the one being offered by the myth mongers. Examples
of myth creation in fiction include the stories told by the
rulers of Plato’s ideal city (the Republic) that were designed
to motivate members of the different classes21 and the
foundational myths that supported the violent actions of
both the Hutus and the Tutsis during the Rwandan
massacres of 1994.22
For a more benign example, consider the conscious
mythmaking that has taken place in Israel, such as the
“transformation of the 1920 defense of a new Jewish
settlement in Tel Hai into a national myth,” turning a defeat
into a symbol of national revival.23
Closely related to myth making is the strategy of
creating alternative exemplars. Members of an at-risk
population often become at risk because of a failure to
identify with a member of a non-violent non-state actor or a
member of the government or occupying power. VNSA
21
22

. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, at bk. 4 (Robin Waterfield trans., 1993).
. For more about these myths, see RYSZARD KAPUSCINSKI, THE SHADOW OF THE
SUN: MY AFRICAN LIFE 165-82 (2001). Owing to the mostly fabricated early
history of the region, the Tutsis were viewed as being pastoral patrons (i.e.,
rulers) who preside over their clients (i.e., slaves), the Hutu agriculturalists.
Under colonial rule by both the Germans and the Belgians, this
foundational myth was reinforced, with separate identity cards being
issued for both peoples. The Belgians even went so far as to argue that the
Tutsi were, racially speaking, more closely related to white people, and
were hence a superior race, putting in place a quite different but
nonetheless related foundational myth. Needless to say, these myths
played a large part in the violence that erupted in 1994. See CHRIS LOWE,
AFRICA ACTION, TALKING ABOUT “TRIBE”: MOVING FROM STEREOTYPES TO ANALYSIS 2 (2008),
available
at,
http://www.africaaction.org/bp/documents/TalkingaboutTribeFeb
2008Update_001.pdf.
23 . YAEL ZERUBAVEL, RECOVERED ROOTS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE MAKING OF ISRAELI
NATIONAL TRADITION, at back cover (1995).
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“identity entrepreneurs” can exploit existing ethnic, racial,
economic, or social political differences by elevating
someone who shares the same characteristics as the
exploited class to a position of prestige or power. Members
of the at-risk group then come to identify with that exemplar
and may feel compelled to adopt the violent strategies
advocated by the exemplar’s VNSA. Creating alternative
exemplars that share the salient characteristics of the
exemplar but who do not advocate violence or who can show
the way towards a non-violent solution to the issues that are
fueling VNSA emergence help interrupt the VNSA life cycle.
Alternative exemplar creation may involve symbolic acts on
the part of the government that tap those elements of “hot”
emotion-laden cognition and heuristics and biases
mentioned earlier. An example of the alternative exemplar
creation strategy in action is the praise and warm
endorsement heaped upon John Garang, the leader of the
Sudanese guerrilla faction of the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA), during his visit to Washington just
before Christmas of 1995. Such endorsement was critical for
the recruitment and logistics boost the SPLA received that
enabled Garang’s forces to recapture crucial cities in
southern Sudan soon thereafter.24 In this case, we
encouraged the growth of a VNSA by cultivating an exemplar
saliently different from the leaders of the Sudanese regime.
An alternate affective strategy includes fomenting a
metaphor shift that affects the way in which at-risk
populations or members of a VNSA frame their actions.
Given the power of metaphor to shape human thought, it
should come as no surprise that the shifting metaphors
people use to frame worldviews and guide decisions could
cause a change in their reasoning. For example, to convince
someone that “cluster of cells” is a more appropriate
metaphor for an unborn embryo than “young human” may
very well change their stand on the issue of abortion. 25
Shifting metaphors requires making connections between
the way people presently view a situation or issue and the
24

. BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE AND POWER IN THE HEART
AFRICA 224–25 (2001).
25 . See Paul Churchland, Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral
Virtues, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 77, 85–86 (João Branquinho ed.,
2001); William D. Casebeer, Moral Cognition and its Neural Constituents, 4
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 840, 840–46 (2003); WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL
FACTS: EVOLUTION, CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION 101–25 (2003).
OF
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way you would like them to frame the situation or issue.26
The common refrain, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom fighter,” is a simple example of metaphor shift; if
you can make the charge of “you are not a freedom fighter,”
or “you are not actually crusading on behalf of true
Muslims,” stick, you go a long way toward defusing certain
narratives.27 Even the patriotic revolutionaries participating
in the Boston Tea Party were viewed as criminals and
dangerous insurrectionists by many of their fellow
colonialists. Manipulation of existing identities (e.g., national,
tribal, ethnic) is yet another affective strategy.28 This does
not necessarily require creating new foundational myths or
alternate exemplars; instead, skillful use of existing
cleavages can decrease a VNSA’s stock of negative entropy.
This is the “flip side” of the identity entrepreneur’s efforts
that are often part of the genesis and growth of VNSA. For
example, the Masaai warriors in Tanzania have skillfully
manipulated existing identity cleavages to elevate the
warrior aspect of Masaai culture over other aspects such as
pastoral herder or Tanzanian citizen. This involved the
creation of camps for young Masaai males, where they learn
compelling stories, foundational myths about ancient Masaai
warriors, and hunting and combat skills. The Tanzanian
government, if it wished, could exploit other aspects of
Masaai history, including the fact that their lineage includes
an important pastoral element, to de-emphasize the violent
aspects of Masaai culture to ensure they remain a peaceful
non-state actor.29
For an Islamic example, consider Bassam Tibi’s position
that moderate members of the Islamic faith (especially Sufis)
could best confront malignant forms of fundamentalism by
emphasizing strands in Islamic narrative history that
26

. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 7, at 337–38 (discussing how to
enable “frame shifts”).
27 . Consider, for instance, the conceptual shift that occurs in members
of the Israeli army when they start thinking about Palestinian teenagers as
being an enemy rather than a peer. See EYAL BEN-ARI, MASTERING SOLDIERS:
CONFLICT, EMOTIONS, AND THE ENEMY IN AN ISRAELI MILITARY UNIT 76–78 (1998).
28 . For an excellent discussion of this process, see DANIEL BYMAN, KEEPING
THE PEACE: LASTING SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS 100–24 (2002).
29 . Interview with Masaai nationals in Tanzania (June 2002). For more
background on Tanzania’s history, as well as detail on the Rwandan
situation, see CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: ROOTS AND RESOLUTION 238–43, 246–48
(Tanzania), 53–86 (Rwanda) (Taisier Ali & Robert Matthews eds., 1999).
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I am a Sufi, but in my mind I subscribe to aql/reason, and in this I
follow the Islamic rationalism of Ibn Rushd/Averroës. Moreover, I
read Islamic scripture, as any other, in the light of history, a
practice I learned from the work of the great Islamic philosopher of
history Ibn Khaldun. The Islamic source most pertinent to [my]
intellectual framework . . . is the ideal of al-madina al-fadila/the
perfect state, as outlined in the great thought of the Islamic
political philosopher al-Farabi. Al-Farabi’s “perfect state” has a
rational, that is, secular order and is best administered by a
reason-oriented philosopher. . . . A combination of these Islamic
sources, the Sufi love of Ibn ´Arabi, the reason-based orientation of
Ibn Rushd, the historicizing thought of Ibn Khaldun, and al-Farabi’s
secular concept of order, seem to me the best combination of
cornerstones for an Islamic enlightenment.30

To get yet more concrete, consider the elements of
typical narratives offered by Islamic insurgents. For Vlahos,
those included a heroic journey and mythic figure, an epic
historical struggle, a charge of renewal, and a mystic
interpretation of history.31 Any action32 we can take that
would decrease the probability that bin Laden could be
interpreted as a hero, that diminishes the likelihood that we
could be cast as the antagonist in a historical struggle, that
makes it seem less likely “resisting” us would lead to Islamic
renewal, or that diminishes bin Laden’s ability to sell a
mythical interpretation of the struggle, would be effective at
defusing the power of the story. For example, part of the
reason why Brigadier General David Petraeus’ 101st
Airborne has been so successful in northern Iraq has to do
with the careful manner in which they have carried out
police raids, going so far as to rebuild house doors busted
down even when those doors were on houses that did in fact
contain insurgent weapons. This has done much to disarm
the justice frames at play in the story-sphere there.33
Or consider Juergensmeyer’s list:34 Is the struggle over
basic identity? Is losing the struggle unthinkable? Can the
struggle not be won in real terms? Are there actions we can
take or speech acts we can engage in, that lessen the threat
30
31
32

. BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM, at xv (1998).
. VLAHOS, supra note 16, at 8.
. Any action includes a speech act. Merely saying things differently
might be enough in many cases.
33 . Phone interview with Brigadier Gen. David Petraeus, 101st Airborne
Div. (2005).
34 . JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 18, at 164–66.
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our presence poses to Islamic identity? Can we assure the
populations of a country or region we are occupying that
successful occupation would not imply the destruction of
cherished values? Can we engage in “cultural confidence
building measures” that assure target populations they can
achieve many of their goals even within the context of
occupation or reconstruction? These actions may be as
simple as avoiding certain terms in our speech (e.g.,
“crusade”), while other actions required to see a story
through may be quite complicated.
In many cases the tactical success achieved by taking
action we know may feed a malignant narrative may
nonetheless justify them. Even then, we should be aware of
the impact our actions are having on the “telling of stories”
in the backstreets and communities of at-risk populations so
that we can, where possible, mitigate any negative upshot.

6. A SIMPLE EVALUATIVE MECHANISM: ARISTOTLE’S
RHETORICAL MODEL
In practice, effective counter-narrative strategy requires
understanding the components and content of the story
being told to predict how they influence the action of a
target audience. In other words, we need a sophisticated
understanding of strategic rhetoric. This is difficult to come
by. Nonetheless, even well-worn and simple models of this
process, such as that offered by the ancient Greek
philosopher Aristotle in his Rhetoric, can be very useful for
structuring our thinking. Aristotle would have us evaluate
three components of a narrative relative to a target
audience: (1) What is the ethos of the speaker or deliverer?
(2) What is the logos of the message being delivered? (3)
Does the message contain appropriate appeals to pathos?35
Consideration of ethos would emphasize the need to
establish credible channels of communication, conveyed by
actors who have the character and reputation required to
ensure receipt and belief of the message. “You have bad
ethos” is merely another way of saying “You will not be
believed by the target audience because they do not think
you are believable.” Consideration of logos involves the
rational elements of the narrative: Is it logical? Is it
35

. Aristotle, Rhetoric, in THE RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE 24–25 §
1356a (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., 1954).
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consistent enough to be believed? Does it contain (from the
target’s perspective) non-sequiturs and forms of reasoning
not normally used? Finally, pathos deals with the emotional
content of the story. Does the story cue appropriate affective
and emotive systems in the human brain? Does it appeal to
emotion in a way that engages the whole person and that
increases the chances the story will actually motivate
action?
Thomas Coakley summarizes the Aristotelian model in
his paper on the Peruvian counter-terrorism experience:
Ethos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience to
establish credibility. Essentially, ethos is what a speaker uses—
implicitly or explicitly—to ensure that the audience can trust him or
her. An example in advertising is an athlete endorsing an athletic
product. In war, examples include a history of adherence to LOAC
[Laws of Armed Conflict] and an assertiveness of willpower.
Pathos: these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience’s
emotions. An example of this would be an advertisement for tires
that emphasizes safety by portraying an infant cradled within the
circle of the tire. In war, pathos might be displayed by showing the
“average” guy on the adversary’s side that the US position is
better.
Logos: these are appeals to facts. More doctors recommend
toothpaste X than any other brand. In war, there is no greater logic
than firepower, but as insurgencies demonstrated throughout the
twentieth century, firepower (logos) alone will not win wars, and
will win very few arguments.36

Some of these Aristotelian considerations will be affected
by structural elements of the story37; others will be affected
36

. William D. Casebeer, The Stories Markets Tell: Affordances for
Ethical Behavior in Free Exchange, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES
IN THE ECONOMY 1, 8 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008) (quoting THOMAS COAKLEY, INST. FOR
NAT’L SECURITY STUD. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TERROR: THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE,
GLOBALIZATION,
AND
US
POLICY
(2003)),
available
at
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8657.html.
37 . Structural elements include whether the story is coherent, simple
enough to be processed, can it be remembered, is it easy to transmit, and
if believed, will it motivate appropriate action? Indeed, some structure and
content of stories may cause narratives to act as primary reinforcers—that
is, just like food, drugs, or sex. A fascinating neurobiological exploration of
this process of successful “cultural messaging” is being carried out by the
author and neuroscientists such as Read Montague, head of the Baylor
College of Medicine’s Human Neuroimaging Laboratory. Innovative new
techniques such as “hyperscanning” allow social cognition to be studied in
vitro at the neural level using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. See
generally Baylor College of Medicine, Human Neuroimaging Laboratory,
http.www.hnl.bcm. tmc.edu/hyperScan.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
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by content.38
Ascertaining how these issues interact to ensure success
in counter-narrative efforts is a complex process. In general,
though, consideration of these ideas leads to this nonexhaustive list of basic strategic principles for the
formulation and application of counter-narrative strategy,
some of which we have already briefly discussed.

7. NARRATIVE “STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES,” AND SOME
COMPLICATIONS
Effective counter-narrative strategy will be guided by the
following strategic principles:
(1) Target audience characteristics are critical. Formulating a narrative without understanding the culture of the
population you wish to influence is at best a recipe for
ineffectiveness and at worst can backfire.
(2) Darwinian competitiveness counts. Stories will be
more likely to be received and understood if they are fit for
the environment in which they are expected to flourish.
Some basic considerations include whether or not stories
take advantage of heuristics and biases (e.g., since
memorable events are easier for a target audience to recall,
memorable events should form the skeleton of a story).
(3) Aristotle is better than nothing. Considerations of
ethos, logos, and pathos (E/L/P) are simplistic. But they are
better than not bothering to evaluate the storyline at all.
Relative to a target population, an E/L/P analysis can provide
a baseline for predicting and controlling narrative flow over
the course of a conflict.
(4) There are two important story sets: the ones our
adversary is telling, and the one being told implicitly and
explicitly by us. Terrorist organizations have instrumental
incentives to “get out the story” that form a necessary part
of their continued survival and enables their goal
achievement. We need to consider not only whether our
38

. Content elements include: does the narrative resonate with target
audiences, is the protagonist of the story a member of the target
audience’s in-group, and is the antagonist of the story a member of a
hated out-group? It may very well be that some aspects of narrative are
evaluated in exactly the same way that theories in the sciences are
evaluated: according to their simplicity, output power, explanatory power,
justificatory power, coherence, breadth, clarity and psychological
plausibility.
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story is being told well, but also how both our actions and
storytelling affect the plausibility of the stories they are
introducing into the environment. To do this well requires
getting inside the “narrative OODA-loop” of our adversary
(where OODA is an acronym which stands for ObserveOrient-Decide-Act, a description of the basic decision-cycle
for organizations first postulated by US Air Force Colonel
John Boyd).
(5) Tactical success may require overriding strategic
story considerations. While grand counter-terrorism strategy
will require counter-narrative considerations for success, it
may very well be that strategic story considerations will be
overridden in many circumstances by demands for tactical
or short-term success. Understanding this tension will enable
us to build stories that will be only minimally affected by
such reversals.
(6) Stories with firewalls are better than stories without
defenses. Narratives need to come equipped with an
immune system. Some stories are more resilient than others
to changes in the environment; the best of stories make
sense—to use Karl Popper’s language,39 it will fail to be
falsified. We should think about how to firewall stories to
prevent their destruction or cooption.
(7) Adaptability and flexibility are important. The story
environment is fluid, and stories should be too. While it
would undermine our ethos to change stories often, our
logos may demand that we do so at times. Anticipating this,
we should create grand narratives that have some built-in
adaptability and flexibility. Protagonists and antagonists
change. Basic plot lines shift. Culmination points move.
Critical identities are fluid. This environmental uncertainty
makes adaptability in stories even more important.
Application of these strategic principles for story
formulation is difficult. At any given time, there are myriad
target audiences. We can expect their reactions to be
shaped dynamically. For example, a grand narrative that
was perfectly plausible before Abu Ghraib may be rendered
perfectly inert afterwards. A few critical slips by key public
representatives may entrench an antagonistic narrative,
leaving no choice but to abandon a counter-narrative put in
39

. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40–42 (Basic Books, Inc.
1961) (1959); KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 256 (1962).
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place to combat it. Understanding the temporal mechanics
and dynamics of story flow will be an ad hoc business.
Recognizing this fact, however, and considering what impact
this has for our plans, programs, and policies is far superior
to the alternative of letting our adversaries occupy the
narrative high ground.

8. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
At the least, doing the things discussed above requires
an awareness of the characteristics of target audiences,
knowledge of the narratives and stories at play in their
culture, a model of how actions interact with the
characteristics of those narratives to produce certain results
(even the relatively mundane Aristotelian model just
discussed is a fine place to start), and a willingness to
coordinate actions inter-governmentally to present a unified
narrative front to the target audience.
The organizations and processes needed to do this
successfully are not (alas) in place. Cultural intelligence is
only now getting off the ground. Awareness of the cultural
and societal impact of occupation is being enhanced
systematically relatively late in the game. Where in the
government’s national security apparatus “narrative
unification” and “story consistency checks” would take place
is not clear.40 Given extant concerns about the misuse of
psychological operations, and the public relations disaster of
previous efforts in this direction,41 this lack of institutional
inertia is perhaps understandable. Even so, we are slowly
coming to realize the importance of counter-narrative
strategies, as the September 2004 Defense Science Board
report on strategic communi-cations made clear with its
strong final recommendation:
The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans
and operations have appropriate strategic communication
components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s
diplomatic missions and with theater security cooperation plans;
and extend U.S. STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information

40

. Presumably at high levels such as within the National Security
Council, or high-level working groups within the State Department.
41 . The Pentagon considered an “Office of Strategic Influence” but
hastily shelved the idea. Eric Schmitt and James Dao, A ‘Damaged’
Information Office Is Declared Closed by Rumsfeld, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2002, at A1.
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Operations responsibilities to include DoD support for public
diplomacy. The Department should triple current resources
(personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD
support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations
funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic
communication programs.42

9. THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVES
Having in place effective counter-narrative strategies will
not be a panacea. Nonetheless, if military force is to play the
appropriate role in our national security strategy and the
“Global War on Terror,” we need a more comprehensive
understanding of how a failure to tell good stories can lead
to an increased risk of insurgencies, violent social
movements, and terrorist action. While this Article has been
far too brief to provide a comprehensive understanding of
the relationship between stories, identity, and violent action,
I hope it has at least made plausible the case that we need
to think much more carefully about the relationship between
this rhetorical Clausewitzian trinity43 and state power. A
grand counter-terrorism strategy that actually produces the
results we desire rides on such a subtle psychologically
informed understanding of narratives and terror.
Narratives also play a critical role in several other
cultural phenomena relevant to the study of terrorism and
insurgency, including cultivation of shared group identities
and surrogate consciousness. This exploration is the subject
for the final section of this Article.
10. FRAMING AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
There is little doubt that framing processes—those
processes responsible for influencing how an actor views the
world, such as the narratives discussed earlier—play an
important role in creating and sustaining social mobilization
42

. DEFENSE SCI. BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATION
9
(2004),
available
at
http://www.acq.
osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf. The report is
well worth reading in its entirety.
43 . CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 89 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. &
trans., 1984) (1976) (“As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies
always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence,
hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of
the play of chance and probability with which the creative spirit is free to
roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which
makes it subject to reason alone.”).
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processes in the Middle East. More controversially, framing
processes are also critical for sustaining organizational
efficiency. When movements spawn formal organizations,
those organizations will take advantage of some of the same
processes used by mobilization leaders so as to shore up
support from actors interested in seeing the organization
achieve its goals. Moreover, when organizations find
themselves in turbulent and problematic environments, they
may shift their framing processes so as to cultivate new
stakeholder relationships and broaden the base of those
willing to provide material and moral support. Often, this will
involve expanding the goals of the organization, providing
existing members reason to support these new goals by
developing a sense of shared responsibility for the fate of
those affected by these new objectives—in short, by
cultivating “surrogate consciousness” in their traditional
membership.
Such, I argue, has been the fate of Lebanon’s Hizballah.
Here I argue for a series of linked hypotheses, all germane to
the concept of strategically important culture. First, I
distinguish the concept of surrogate consciousness from
related psychological processes involved in framing.
Surrogate consciousness arises from the conjunction of
empathetic responses with a “thin” sense of shared identity
(especially identities that arise from a recognition of
common fate) even in the face of obvious and selfacknowledged out-group distinctions. This is different from
the activation of either empathy or identity alone, and may
deserve to be recognized as a significant category (akin to
oppositional consciousness) in the mobilization literature, as
it can play a critical role in broadening an organization’s
base of support. Development of surrogate consciousness is
enhanced by consideration of the narrative elements of the
framing process. Second, by analyzing official documents of
Hizballah and the rhetoric of Hizballah leaders such as
Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
Hussein Fadlallah—focusing in particular on how this
verbiage has changed over time—the section provides
evidence that the Party of God has broadened its goals; this
in turn has led to narrative efforts designed to boost
surrogate consciousness in the Shi’a of Lebanon for the
plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Third, and
only very briefly, I argue that whether this is a positive
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development remains an open question; on the one hand,
these developments increase the chances Hizballah will
continue to develop a bona fide constituency and moderate
its goals so they become irredentist rather than millenarian,
making it all the more likely those goals can be achieved by
peaceful political means. This may have the pleasant upshot
of marginalizing the militant wing of Hizballah. On the other
hand, if Palestinians are unable to reach accommodation
with Israel through non-violent means (such as the peace
process), the surrogate consciousness could retrench
Hizballah’s militant elements, which would not be a
favorable development. This is an ambitious set of
hypotheses to develop and defend in part of one article. This
Article’s aim is to provide enough explanation and evidence
to at least make them plausible so as to motivate a more
rigorous research agenda.

11. SURROGATE CONSCIOUSNESS
In general, mobilization—be it for peaceful or violent
collective action—is thought to happen at the intersections
of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing
processes.44 There must be some form of political
opportunity (or lack thereof)—for instance, a state
crackdown on a spontaneous protest might open the political
door for a full-fledged movement. Mobilizing structures
provide resources for movements to grow and expand—for
example, pre-existing social networks may serve as funnels
for financial support for a nascent movement. Finally,
framing processes can (among many other things) motivate
individuals to join nascent movements, groups and
organizations, and may reinforce certain identities so as to
make mobilization easier.45 Critical to the importance of
44

. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS , (Doug McAdam et al.
eds., 1996); Doug McAdam et al., Toward an Integrated Perspective on
Social Movements and Revolution, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE
AND STRUCTURE 142 (Mark Irving Lichback & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997).
45 . “Framing” probably really serves as a placeholder for all nonrational psychological processes involved in mobilization (the sociology and
political science literature tends to call these “subjective processes,”
though this is a bit limiting as the psychological processes undergirding
these phenomena need have no experiential or phenomenological
component, and are in many cases richly social). I suspect that there are
more psychological processes worthy of consideration than those identified
in the extant literature.
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frames is the notion that they can resonate to greater or
lesser degrees with target audiences.46
Generally, social psychological facts (such as the
development of group identity or awareness of one’s self as
a part of a larger collective) are most likely to intervene
upon the mobilization process via framing effects. Consider
the idea of oppositional consciousness.47 Oppositional
consciousness is one process whereby members of a
persecuted or oppressed group become aware of themselves
as group members for the purposes of spurring action.
Oppositional consciousness—“an empower-ing mental state
that prepares members of an oppressed group to act to
undermine, reform or overthrow a system of human
domination”—involves, according to Jane Mansbridge,
“identifying with members of a subordinate group,
identifying injustices done to that group, opposing these
injustices, and seeing the group as having a shared interest
in ending or diminishing those injustices.”48 Framing will
affect all these facets of oppositional consciousness. Justice
frames, for example, will make salient to a group the
injustices being done to them, while motivational frames will
increase the likelihood a member of the affected group will
take action to end the injustice.
Surrogate consciousness is similar to, but separate from,
oppositional
consciousness.49
Like
oppositional
consciousness, surrogate consciousness will be affected by
framing. It will involve some of the same processes as
oppositional consciousness, and in many regards functions
just as it does—to prepare members of a group for action.
But
unlike
oppositional
consciousness,
surrogate
46

. See generally D. A. Snow & R. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance,
and Participant Mobilization, in 1 FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION 197, 197–217 (B.
Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow eds., 1988).
47 . See Aldon Morris & Naomi Braine, Social Movements and
Oppositional Consciousness, in OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF
SOCIAL PROTEST 20 (J. Mansbridge & A. Morris eds., 2001).
48 . Jane Mansbridge, The Making of Oppositional Consciousness, in
OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF SOCIAL PROTEST 4–5 (J.
Mansbridge & A. Morris eds., 2001).
49 . In order to confirm that surrogate consciousness was not already a
commonly used concept in the mobilization literature, I skimmed multiple
seminal articles from the framing and identity bodies of work. Also, a
Google search turned up no academic uses of the phrase, nor did a JSTOR
search turn up any salient references. My apologies to the original
discoverer if the phrase turns out to exist in the prior art.
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consciousness involves action by members of an out-group
on behalf of another group that is being persecuted.
Oppositional consciousness involves the development of
empathy, but such empathy is shared only with in-group
members (indeed, this is what makes it oppositional rather
than merely generally empathetic). In the case of surrogate
consciousness, however, empathy is developed for another
group even when one recognizes that one is not in fact a
member of that group.
To summarize, according to our nascent theory,
surrogate consciousness arises from the conjunction of
empathetic responses with a very shallow sense of shared
identity (especially identities that arise from recognition of
common fate, which is probably the identity generating
mechanism which generates the thinnest, most violable
sense of identity50) whilst nonetheless recognizing the
existence of obvious out-group distinctions.51 Some empirical
50

. See generally Leonie Huddy, Group Identity and Political Cohesion,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (David Sears et al. eds., 2003)
(reviewing major theories of the development of group identity). On the
whole, social context is critically important for racial and ethnic
acculturation vis-à-vis group identity. This is no surprise, as there is an
entire theory (called “social learning theory”) dedicated to the role that
social and group interaction plays in the development of attitudes and
skills. Social learning theory was most comprehensively articulated by
Albert Bandura in the 1960s and 1970s. Bandura placed special emphasis
on how new behavior is acquired through observational learning via
cognitive processes. Social learning did not require that there be rewards
and punishments for learned behavior to occur (as in the neo-behaviorist
paradigm that dominated cognitive science in the early twentieth century);
rather, all that was required were “the minimal components of attention to
a behavioral sequence, retention of its form, and the ability to reproduce
the behavioral sequence.” Shelly E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social
Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1998). The core components of personal cum group identity
are learned, on this picture, and such behavior as prejudice or
discrimination (or even a willingness to resort to violence to solve
problems) is transmitted through various social groups—primarily via story
telling—because children hear and see such attitudes in action in their
peers, parents, and authority figures. It is easy to see how the
development of prejudice, which may be a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for organized violence to be committed against outgroups, is contingent upon cultural and social factors themselves tightly
related to narratives.
51 . Huddy points out that the four major theoretical approaches
regarding the construction of group identity (which consist of the cognitive
approach, realistic interest approaches, social identity theory, and social
constructivist theory) all make somewhat different predictions regarding
sources of commonality and critical issues around which members may
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examples may help. Steve notices that homosexuals are
being subtly discriminated against in my neighborhood;
despite the fact that Steve is a heterosexual, he nonetheless
acts on the behalf of the gay community by attending gay
pride parades and donating money to the International Gay
and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, perhaps in part
because he fears that he—as a member of a minority
religion (let’s stipulate that Steve is a Christian Scientist)—
may eventually face the same persecution. This would be a
classic case of acting out of surrogate consciousness.

12. HIZBALLAH: A POTTED HISTORY
The task for this section will be to demonstrate that
Hizballah has used different framing devices in their rhetoric
in an attempt to develop surrogate consciousness in their
traditional constituency for the purposes of expanding their
base. Perhaps they hope to eventually be able to appeal to
the members of the group on whose behalf they have
mobilize. Huddy, supra note 50, at 518–21. A thumbnail sketch of these
approaches will help us understand her conclusion. The cognitive approach
to formation of group identity emphasizes the importance of selfperception in the development of cohesive groups: individuals become
group members because they identify with the group and wish to emulate
typical group members. Id. Realistic interest approaches stress the
common interests that groups share and advance; common fate is thus
especially critical. If all of Islam is threatened, and we are Muslims, then it
is more likely that we will become cohesive so as to achieve the common
objective of protecting the shared interests of our group. Id. Social identity
theorists emphasize the importance of symbolic interactions between
groups and potential members; group members endorse group
memberships because of a need to achieve a positive sense of social
identity that will differentiate their own group from others. Id. Social
constructivism takes social identity one step further: concepts derive their
meaning from social practices; this theory stresses how social identities
form even among strangers so long as enough shared interactions can
occur to generate the construction of the group as a group. Huddy rightly
notes that
The cognitive approach predicts cohesion among the members of
any salient group; realistic interest theory confines cohesion to
groups whose members share a common fate; social identity
theory points to unity among widely stigmatized groups, such as
low-status ethnic or racial groups, religious sects (etc.), whose
members cannot easily pass as belonging to a higher status group;
and a social constructivist perspective predicts cohesion among
members who share a common understanding of group
membership.
Id. at 521. I’ll briefly discuss these approaches later in the main text.
Resolving the tensions between these various theories of group
identification is beyond the scope of this article.
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developed surrogacy. The group in whom surrogate
consciousness is being developed includes the traditional
subjects of Hizballah: the people of occupied southern
Lebanon, especially Shi’a. The group on whose behalf the
consciousness is being developed includes Palestinians living
in the occupied territories. Part of the reason why Hizballah
is taking this action was to prepare the way for being
acknowledged as a legitimate actor, not just in the Lebanese
political scene but also in the larger Southwest Asian political
arena, and not just for Shi’a, but for all groups that have
faced injustice in the region—or so I hope to demonstrate in
the next section.
Some background on Hizballah is in order. Hizballah is
Arabic for “Party of God.”52 It is a Shi’a political organization
that has a militant and sometimes terrorist wing.53
Aboriginally,
it
articulated
three
main
objectives:
establishing a Shi’a state in Lebanon modeled directly upon
the Islamic Republic of Iran, causing the destruction of Israel,
and neutralizing U.S. influence in the region.54
In the realm of violent militant action, Hizballah’s
activities have included several high profile terrorist
incidents. In addition to multiple kidnappings in the 1980s,
the infamous Beirut truck bombing of U.S. Marines, the 1985
hijacking of TWA Flight 847, and attacks on Jewish
community centers and buildings in Argentina in 1992 and
1994, Hizballah launched a series of suicide bombings in the
occupied territories.55 A pre-9/11 chart contained in an article
by Ehud Sprinzak demonstrates how successfully Hizballah
executed suicide bombings, being the second largest group
in terms of aggregate attacks56 (though it is critical to note
that Hizballah has since denounced the use of suicide
bombings following their involvement with them in the
mid-1980s).
In order to carry out these attacks, Lebanese Hizballah
52

. CFR.org, Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah), http://www.cfr.org/
publication/9155/hezbollah_aka_hizbollah_hizbullah.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2008).
53 . Id.
54 . Id.
55 . See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, RAND, REPORT NO. R-378-USDP, RECENT
TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF IRANIAN SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 15–34
(1990), available at http://rand.org/pubs/ reports/2005/R3783.pdf.
56 . Ehud Sprinzak, Rational Fanatics, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at
66, 69.
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has developed a large and robust organization. It consists of
thousands of supporters and members, and hundreds of
terrorist operatives.57
This infrastructure developed in part owing to the
group’s ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran.58 In addition to
the obvious ideological commonalities given the group’s
revolutionary goals, Hizballah receives substantial financial
support from Iran. Also, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps has been extensively involved in training and
organizing Hizballah (their foundational involvement in the
early 1980s was critical during the group’s initial
organization). Via a series of Syrian airfields, Iran has air
supply connections to the group.
Social movement theory provides us with insight into
how the conditions for Hizballah’s genesis developed (in
large part, as a reaction to the Shah’s program of
Westernization). “Identity entrepreneurs,” such as the
group’s spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlallah, were instrumental
in establishing the organization and moving it through the
growth phase. During maturity, the organization carried out
militant action; however, as some of its realizable political
goals were achieved, and as it gained a larger constituency
via the provision of social services such as education and
health care, the organization broadened in terms of goals
and functions. Eventually, Hizballah came to have a political
face, and today the Secretary General of Hizballah is Sheik
Nasrallah. Hizbollah is an active participant in the political
life and processes of Lebanon, and its scope of operation is
far beyond its initial militant one.59 In 1992, it participated in
elections for the first time, winning twelve out of 128 seats in
parliament.60 It won ten seats in 1996, and now holds eight.61
A stakeholder analysis reveals traceability between
developments in Hizballah capacities and patronage from
one of the major stakeholders—Iran. For instance, Imad
57

. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 251
(2006),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/29722.pdf.
58 . The Wikipedia entry on Hizballah is excellent and provides a good
table of organization, background, and historical review. Hezbollah,
http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizballah (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
59 . Id.
60 . Id.
61 . Id. Hizbollah won fourteen seats in the 2005 election. CFR.org,
supra note 52.
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Munniyah came to dominate the security apparatus of
Hizballah, and with his ties to Iranian intelligence, he almost
certainly used organizational methods from Iran to radically
increase Hizballah’s effectiveness in the 1980s. Solid
organizational techniques and good traceability between
activities led to Hizballah’s increasing effectiveness as a
militant organization, but it also led to their broadening into
an organization with a legitimate political face as well.
Classic reinforcing actions were also taken by Hizballah
as they eventually became the largest single provider of
social services in southern Lebanon, displacing competitors
such as the government of Lebanon (though in many cases
the government welcomed Hizballah’s assumption of these
responsibilities). “Niche construction” activities like the
delivery of health care and food aid are critically important,
as they can lead to the development of a stable
constituency, which in turn may help moderate an
organization’s more militant tendencies,62 as I will briefly
discuss later.
This potted and all-too-brief summary of Hizballah is
intended to establish two main points: first, that the
organization’s goals have broadened as time has passed,
becoming more politically realistic; and second, that
Hizballah has developed a bona fide political constituency,
whom they represent both in the Lebanese parliament and
regionally. These modifications have required Hizballah to
broaden its base, which in time has led to the articulation of
a new narrative designed to generate surrogate
consciousness. Before providing textual evidence for this last
point, a detour into narrative theory will help provide
foundations for
understanding
tropes and
themes
emphasized in Hizballah’s media presence.63
Any of these aspects of narrative would be fascinating
and important to examine in detail. The next few
paragraphs, however, focus on the relationship between
stories and identity mobilization, as this aspect is critical to
62
63

. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 19, at 80–83.
. Several of the following paragraphs are taken from portions of an
article I co-authored with James Russell. William D. Casebeer & James A.
Russell, Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘CounterNarrative Strategy’, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Mar. 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.
navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.asp. Portions used in the next few
pages were written by me. My thanks to Troy Thomas for multiple insights
related to this section.
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13. THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY AND SHIFTS IN HIZBALLAH
RHETORIC
In order to understand how and why individuals in places
like Lebanon eventually become members of Hizballah, we
need to better grasp both how individual identities are
formed and how they interact with groups and cultures to
shape a sense of collective identity. The literature on both
identity formation and identity interaction is voluminous;
however, some key points from it can usefully inform our
analysis.
Groups of individuals that feel they share a common
fate, possess a common identity, face a common threat, or
have communal needs, are abundant in most environments.
In conditions of violence, where governments are failing to
provide basic safety/security needs (think of Lebanon in the
aftermath of the civil war), these sometimes latent or
“weakly felt” identities are prone to even greater
mobilization, with the individual increasingly identifying with
the competing identity group rather than the political state.
That is, in the right kinds of environments, it is relatively
easy for identity entrepreneurs—the tellers of stories that
speak to questions of fundamental identity—to make
headway in motivating people to act in defense of a group,
or play a critical role in a plot that includes the group as
protagonist and some other power as antagonist. This is
especially the case when we are told certain stories
throughout the formative periods of our lives that can easily
be recast to provoke a backlash to things like government
failure, occupation, or reconstruction.64
The brief review of Hizballah’s history from a few pages
ago gives us a priori reason to think the narratives they use
to do things like shore up stakeholder support have evolved
over the years. There is also textual and other media-based
evidence for this conclusion, and some of the narratives
seem to have the purpose of creating surrogate
consciousness. Consider first an interview with Fadlallah (the
spiritual leader for Hizballah) from a 1987 issue of the
64

. See generally TROY THOMAS, ET AL., WARLORDS RISING: CONFRONTING VIOLENT
NON-STATE ACTORS (2005) (providing literature review). Of note, in the right
circumstances, most any belief system can be radicalized (Christian,
Jewish, secular, etc.).
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Journal of Palestine Studies. In the interview, Fadlallah
discusses the tensions between Palestinians and Shi’a in
Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, openly acknowledging
that “there was political, material and spiritual weariness;
and chaos dominated the south as a result of the disorderly
Palestinian political expansion which interfered both in the
internal struggle between political parties and in family
matters.”65 This assertion was in response to a question from
the Journal regarding why it was that some Shi’a in the south
apparently viewed the Israel arrival in a positive light. While
disputing that all Shi’a felt this way, Fadlallah nonetheless
acknowledges that the “Palestinians were expanding in a
disturbing way”66 and that it is in the nature of some regional
actors to “score points”67 against rivals in Palestinian-Arab
political disputes by turning a blind eye to actions they
would otherwise condemn (e.g., the Israeli invasion of
Southern Lebanon).
Later, Fadlallah is even more explicit that he believes
“that the Arab political scene, and particularly the Lebanese
scene, is moving to free itself from the burden of the
Palestine problem.”68 While Fadlallah discusses in this
interview that Hizballah has goals that include the essential
elimination of Israel as a political force, and uses this to
distinguish Hizballah from Amal (which had more limited
goals of freeing Southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation),
he nonetheless is careful to disentangle Hizballah from direct
connection to the Palestinian cause as such.
Considerations like this place Hizballah in a bind. On the
one hand, the fact that Israel actually completed their
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave Hizballah enormous
prestige, as Hizballah’s resistance had arguably led to the
first successful case of resistance against Israeli territorial
aggression in the region. On the other hand, this
development also meant that Hizballah had to find other
goals to justify its continued existence as a regional political
actor; this was complicated by the fact that their provision of
social services, education, and medical care had broadened
Hizballah’s base and contributed to their emergence as a
65

.
South
66 .
67 .
68 .

Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, The Palestinians, the Shi’a, and
Lebanon, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1987, at 3, 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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political force in Lebanon replete with explicit representative
duties.
In 1991, Hizballah founded their television station, alManar (“the Lighthouse”). Al-Manar is extremely popular
regionally, ranking second only to Al-Jazeera in popularity in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.69 Al-Manar broadcasts
numerous motivational videos with stirring slogans and
professionally produced graphics and music. These polemical
videos serve several purposes, one of which, I contend, is
the facilitation of surrogate consciousness for the Palestinian
plight in Lebanese viewers. Al-Manar station manager Nayef
Krayem says as much, stating that the station has links to
multiple militant Palestinian groups (including the military
wing of Fatah’s Abu Musa faction and the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades), and that part of the station’s mission is to
generate material and moral support for the Palestinian
struggle against Israeli occupation.70 Hizballah Deputy
Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassam told Lebanese
Future Television that Hizballah provides “national support
to the Palestinians through al-Manar television,”71 and
Hussein Nasrallah’s rhetoric in multiple venues has included
consciousness raising on behalf of the Palestinian struggle.72
Consider, for example, a video broadcast which includes
images of a suicide bomber destroying an Israeli checkpoint.
Or in another case, a video shows footage of Israeli
bulldozers knocking down Palestinian dwellings. A third video
details Palestinian suicide bombers who have died while
killing IDF members. These videos emphasize the themes
that would need to be developed if surrogate consciousness
were to appear. Recall that (in the case of the development
of related oppositional consciousness) the group would need
to become aware of injustices, identify with the group being
repressed, and feel the need to redress the injustices; in the
case of surrogate consciousness, feeling of group belonging
69

. See generally AVI JORISCH, BEACON OF HATRED: INSIDE HIZBALLAH’S AL-MANAR
TELEVISION (2004). Of note, I disagree with many of the policy
recommendations Jorisch floats in this book, and I recognize that the
Washington Institute has a “not-so-hidden” agenda. Even so, the book
offers valuable background information, and the CD it contains has
numerous video clips from station broadcasts which are very interesting
and useful.
70 . Id. at 34.
71 . Id.
72 . Id. (Clips 17, 35 and 39 on the CD-ROM included with book).
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does not need to be present, or if it is present it is sustained
only by common fate considerations and will also probably
involve recognition that one is not actually a member of the
surrogate group. Such videos lay the groundwork for all
these things by raising awareness of injustices done to the
Palestinians, by providing a means of redressing them (alManar broadcasts bank account information for those who
wish to donate to organizations which support violent action
in response, and also provides sometime material and moral
support to Palestinian organizations such as Hamas), and by
laying the emotional groundwork for support for things like
the second Intifada via the use of resonant music and
emotion-laden images.73
One objection is that to assume any particular
broadcasts reflect shifts in strategic goals of Hizballah would
be unjustified. This is probably the case. For instance, there
are links between themes emphasized in al-Manar
programming and short-term political goals related to the
Lebanese elections. Consider, for instance, the period
between May and September 2000, in which the tone and
content shifted to emphasize the Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon, Hizballah’s successful military campaign, and
Israeli military weaknesses. The “triumph over Israel” theme
was probably related not just to facts on the ground about
the Israeli/Lebanon situation but also to the upcoming
September 2000 Lebanese parliamentary elections.74 Even
so, the shift in tone and content about the Palestinian plight
has sustained itself for long enough that the conclusion that
this change from the attitude of practiced distant concern of
the mid-80’s is more than a tactical political development is
plausible. It passes the sniff test.

14. UPSHOTS OF SURROGACY
Whether this development is a positive one remains an
open question. On the one hand, it increases the chances
Hizballah will continue to develop a bona fide constituency
and moderate its goals so they become irredentist rather
than millenarian, making it all the more likely those goals
can be achieved by peaceful political means. This may have
73

. Id. at 67–70. I realize these examples do not necessarily disprove
the null hypothesis. They are suggestive, however.
74 . Id. at 37.
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the pleasant upshot of marginalizing the militant wing of
Hizballah. As Baylouny points out, involvement in democratic
institutions has a moderating influence even on those who
have anti-system goals.75 Cultivation of a bona fide
constituency tends to decrease the likelihood of violent
political action, as such cultivation usually involves the
formation of moderate organizations and institutions
designed to minister to the needs of this constituency.
On the other hand, if Palestinians are unable to reach
accommodation with Israel through non-violent means (e.g,
via the resurgent peace process), the development of
surrogate consciousness could retrench Hizballah’s militant
elements, which would not be a favorable development.76
Developing surrogate consciousness boosts the complexity
and interconnectedness of the system; from a policy-making
perspective, this can be both a good and bad thing,
contingent upon how the system as a whole develops.
Before concluding, let us acknowledge the multiple
limitations afflicting my thesis for this Article. These
limitations include not only space limitations but also my
radically incomplete survey of Hizballah rhetoric and
propaganda, amplified by the complication that the author
does not speak or read Arabic (this limitation is being
redressed in the long run). The necessary resources were
not available to distinguish between elite rhetoric and other
layers of stratification in Hizballah’s organization; a more indepth study would discuss this difference in detail.77 Nor did
this Article provide a comprehensive review of the political
75

. Ann Marie Baylouny, Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in
Islamic
Movements,
STRATEGIC
INSIGHTS,
Apr.
2004,
at
2,
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/apr/baylounyApr04.asp.
76 . Daniel Byman argues that we should not crack down on Hizballah
itself, but should instead focus on undercutting Iranian and Syrian
stakeholder involvement. This tack, he contends, will maximize the
chances that Hizballah will fully become a mainstream political actor.
Daniel Byman, Should Hezbolah Be Next?, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at
54, 64–66.
77 . Consider, for example, Glenn Robinson’s argument that Hamas and
the PLO converged in their use of symbology even as animosity between
elites in the organizations persisted. GLENN E. ROBINSON, BUILDING A PALESTINIAN
STATE 160–62 (1997). While I would assume that Hizballah elites control alManar content, I am not familiar enough with al-Manar’s production
process to say so with complete assurance. An interesting and important
project would be to analyze elite control over Hizballah rhetoric especially
in light of use of media like call-in televised talk shows and the internet
where centralized control of content becomes more difficult.
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context in which Hizballah has been acting. On the whole,
however, despite these limitations these linked theses are at
least plausible and worthy of further investigation.

CONCLUSION
This Article argued for a series of hypotheses. First, it
distinguished the concept of surrogate consciousness from
related psychological processes involved in framing.
Surrogate consciousness arises from the conjunction of
empathetic responses with a “thin” sense of shared identity
even in the face of obvious and self-acknowledged out-group
distinctions; it can play a critical role in broadening an
organization’s base of support. Second, by analyzing official
documents of Hizballah and the rhetoric of Hizballah leaders
such as Nasrallah and Fadlallah and the al-Manar television
station, it provided (admittedly slim) evidence that the Party
of God has broadened its goals and that this in turn has led
to narrative efforts designed to boost surrogate
consciousness in the Shi’a of Lebanon for the plight of
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Third, and most
briefly, this Article argued that whether this is a positive
development is an open question. It contributes to
Hizballah’s maintenance of a constituency, which is a net
positive, but it could also lead to identification with militant
means of resolving disputes should the latest incarnation of
the Palestinian/Israeli peace process fail. Irrespective of how
political events in the Middle East shape—and are shaped by
—Hizballah in the future, this Article has driven home the
importance of understanding the rhetorical and narrative
“top cover” movements and organizations use. Only by
engaging in this endeavor in subtle (and sympathetic) ways
can we hope to shift the story-telling atmosphere in such a
manner that peaceful resolutions to political conflict become
the norm in the region. In other words, a critical aspect of
shifting culture will involve understanding how military force
produces change in
the
narratives
which
shape
organizational development.
It also has served as a test bed for a larger theoretical
point, one that could be the subject for a major research
program: the relationship between narratives, the
development of identity, and the presence of empathy.
Understanding how these three things are interrelated could
help us improve not only the struggle against political
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violence and how to help Hizballah develop into a legitimate
political actor renouncing terrorism, but also how genocides
happen to how we can better engineer a judicial system that
is fair and just. These are all important and pressing
questions for our time.

